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Executive summary
London is an international financial centre, serving European and global clients. A hard 
Brexit would lead to a partial migration of financial firms from London to the EU27 (EU minus 
UK) to ensure they can continue to serve their EU27 clients.
Four major cities will host most of the new EU27 wholesale markets: Frankfurt, Paris, 
Dublin and Amsterdam. These cities have far fewer people employed in finance than London. 
Moreover, they host the European headquarters of fewer large companies. The partial migra-
tion of financial firms will thus have a major impact on these cities and their infrastructures.
Banks are the key players in wholesale markets. United States and Swiss investment banks, 
together with one large German and three large French banks, will make up the core of the 
new EU27 wholesale markets. Some Dutch, Italian and Spanish banks are in the second tier.
The forex, securities and derivatives trading markets are now in London. We map the 
current, limited market share of the four major cities that might host the EU27 client business. 
The expected migration of financial trading will lead to a large increase in trading capacity (eg 
bank trading floors).
Clearing is the backbone of modern financial markets. A comparative overview of 
clearing facilities in the EU27 shows that Germany and France have some clearing capacity, 
but this will need to be expanded. The ownership of clearing is often intertwined with stock 
exchanges. Were the planned LSE-Deutsche Börse merger to go ahead, LSE would sell the 
Paris subsidiary of its clearinghouse.
In terms of legal systems, there is an expectation that trading activities will be able to 
continue under English contract law, also in the EU27. A particular challenge is to develop 
FinTech (financial technology) in the EU27, as this innovative part of the market is currently 
based in London.
We estimate that some 30,000 jobs might move from London to the EU27. This will put 
pressure on the facilities (infrastructure, offices, residential housing) in the recipient cities. 
The more the European Union market for financial services is integrated, the less need there 
will be for financial firms to move to one location, reducing the pressure for all facilities to be 
in one city (see Sapir et al, 2017, which is a companion piece to this paper).
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1 Introduction
London is Europe’s financial hub, providing corporate and investment banking services to 
the European Union’s 28 member countries and beyond. When the United Kingdom will 
leave the EU and its single market by the spring of 2019, UK-based financial firms lose their 
passport to do direct business with EU27 clients1. Brexit thus leads to a partial migration of 
financial firms from London to the EU27 (EU minus the UK2) so that they could continue to 
serve their customers there.
We provide a comparison between London and four major cities that together will host 
most of the new EU27 wholesale market: Frankfurt, Paris, Dublin and Amsterdam. We also 
give a detailed picture of the wholesale markets (foreign exchange, securities and derivatives 
trading), the largest players in these markets (the major banks) and the underlying clearing 
infrastructure. Finally, we provide data on professional services (consulting, legal and audit-
ing) and innovation (financial technology, FinTech).
Separately, in Sapir et al (2017), we discuss the policy challenges the EU27 faces in build-
ing an integrated wholesale market. Sapir et al (2017) also estimates that about 35 percent of 
current wholesale market activities might move from London to the EU27.
2 Comparison of major cities
As some 35 percent of wholesale market activities might migrate from London to other major 
cities in the EU, it is instructive to compare the current ‘capacity’ of cities in terms of the size 
of their current financial market activities and their ability to host incoming activities from 
London. In section 5, we estimate that some 30,000 people might relocate from London to the 
EU27: 10,000 related to core wholesale banking and 18,000 to 20,000 related to professional 
services.
Table 1 on the next page shows the differences in the size of the financial sectors in 
London and other European financial centres – Frankfurt, Paris, Dublin and Amsterdam. 
Where data for the city is not available, Table 1 gives country data. These numbers help us to 
understand capacity constraints when considering a partial relocation of the financial sector.  
All five cities have strong financial sectors. The cities’ shares of gross value added from 
their country’s financial sector ranges from 23 and 25 percent in Paris and Amsterdam to 52 
percent in London and 80 percent in Dublin. London and Dublin in particular offer interna-
tional financial services. While all five cities host a large number of domestically registered 
monetary financial institutions (MFIs), London dwarves the other cities in terms of for-
eign-registered MFIs. This shows London’s pre-eminent position as the international financial 
hub in the EU. This finding is supported by the fact that London also hosts the largest number 
of headquarters of top companies.
In terms of characteristics of the financial sector, London outweighs the other cities by 
an even greater margin. The UK financial sector trade balance, to which London contributes 
the biggest share, is greater than that of France, Germany, Ireland and Amsterdam by a factor 
of more than 10. Tax revenues from the UK financial sector are more than 100 times greater 
than, for example, in Germany. 
In terms of banking, the UK hosts more assets, capital and reserves than any other EU 
country. However, the proportion of finance staff to total population is lower in London than 
1 We refer here to EU27 clients without access to international markets. Some large corporates can, for example, 
issue bonds in New York or London (even after Brexit). 
2 The single market also includes non-EU countries of the European Economic Area. We use ‘EU27’ as shorthand for 
all single market countries. 
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in Frankfurt, Dublin or Amsterdam. Finally, London has a leading role in forex and interest 
rate over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives turnover.
3 Banks
The large investment banks from the US and the large universal banks from Europe are 
essential players in the wholesale markets. These banks bring together the suppliers of capital 
(investors) and those with a need for capital (corporates, governments and households). In 
this way, these banks are the gatekeepers of the EU Capital Markets Union, which aims to 
improve access to funding, allocation of capital and better savings rates for savers. Investment 
bank league tables rank investment banks by market share and typically cover four major 
segments: mergers and acquisitions, equity, bonds and loans (ie syndicated loans). Table 2 on 
the next page shows the top 20 banks, representing about 80 percent of the European invest-
ment banking market (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2016).
Table 1: Comparative overview of the financial sectors, selected cities 
Financial services
London 
(UK)
Paris 
(France)
Frankfurt 
(Germany)
Dublin 
(Ireland)
Amsterdam 
(Netherlands)
Source
Population (‘000) 8,256 6,695 691 1,261 1,021 Eurostat
Financial 
sector
GVA (% of country 
financial sector 
GVA)
52 23 80 25
Europe Economics 
(2011), ONS (2015)
Trade balance 
(€bns)
87.1 6.1 7.4 6.7 0.7 UNCTAD (2015)
Tax revenue (€bns) 28.71 - 0.27 1.53 Europe Economics (2011)
Banking
Number of MFIs 
(domestically 
registered)
132 166 60 104 28 ECB (2015)
Number of MFIs 
(foreign registered)
123 39 63 30 34 ECB (2015)
Capital and 
reserves (€bns)
792 524 464 110 121
European Banking 
Federation (2015)
Banking 
assets
Total assets (€bns) 10,223 6,940 6,955 482 2,528 ECB (2016)
Wholesale (€bns) 5,205 Sapir et al (2017)
Retail (€bns) 5,018 Sapir et al (2017)
Employment
Finance (000s) 352 270 76 20 54 Europe Economics (2011)
Domestic credit 
institutions (000s)
398 408 646 27 90
ECB Structural Financial 
Indicators (2016)
IR 
derivatives 
market
Forex turnover (% 
of global)
37 2.8 1.8 - 1.3 BIS (2016)
IR OTC derivatives 
turnover (% of 
global)
39 4.7 1.0 - 0.7 BIS (2016)
Clearing
LCH Ltd, 
CME, 
LME, ICE
LCH SA Eurex
LCH SA, 
Euro CCP 
NV
BIS payment clearing 
and settlement statistics
Headquarters of top 250 
companies*
40% 8%
2% 
(Munich)
- 2.5% TheCityUK (2016a)
Source: Bruegel based on ONS (2015) Regional Gross Value Added; Eurostat, statistics on European cities; UNCTAD (2015) exports and imports by service category; ECB (2015) List of MFIs; Eu-
ropean Banking Federation, Facts and Figures for 2015; ECB, Structural Financial Indicators 2016; BIS, Triennial Survey; BIS, payment, clearing and settlement statistics. For other sources, see 
the References (page 13). Note: Numbers in red are country-level data, black indicates city level. * Headquarters location of top 250 companies with global or regional headquarters in Europe.
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There are broadly speaking three groups of banks in the league table: 1) US and Swiss 
investment banks; 2) UK universal banks; and 3) euro-area universal banks. We examine the 
first and third groups in more detail below.
Table 2: European Investment Banking, top 20 banks, mid-2016
Rank Bank Country of 
origin
Fees (US $ 
million)
Market 
share (%)
1 JP Morgan US 549 6.1%
2 Goldman Sachs and Co US 483 5.4%
3 Morgan Stanley US 462 5.1%
4 Barclays UK 432 4.8%
5 BNP Paribas SA Euro area 400 4.4%
6 Deutsche Bank Euro area 373 4.1%
7 Citi US 358 4.0%
8 Bank of America Merrill Lynch US 338 3.7%
9 HSBC Holdings PLC UK 329 3.7%
10 Rothschild UK 246 2.7%
11 Société Générale Euro area 212 2.4%
12 Crédit Agricole CIB Euro area 209 2.3%
13 UBS Switzerland 194 2.2%
14 Lazard US 192 2.1%
15 UniCredit Euro area 184 2.0%
16 Credit Suisse Switzerland 151 1.7%
17 ING Euro area 137 1.5%
18 Evercore Partners US 129 1.4%
19 Santander Euro area 116 1.3%
20 Natixis Euro area 112 1.2%
Source: Bruegel based on Thomson Reuters (2016), Investment Banking League Tables.
Detailed data on the investment banks shows that an overwhelming share of their 
turnover and employment is located in the UK, highlighting the UK’s role as a gateway to 
the continental European financial markets for third-country large financial firms. About 90 
percent of the total EU turnover of the largest US and Swiss investment banks3, and about 
an equal share of their EU staff, is located in the UK (Table 3). In the EU27, there is no single 
location where the largest third-country investment banks concentrate their activities. In 
general their activities are scattered. Nevertheless, we see some concentration in Frankfurt, 
Paris, Dublin and Amsterdam. Luxembourg is important for asset management, but that is 
outside the scope of this paper.  
The activities that third-country investment banks already carry out in the EU27 are a 
good indicator of the location of their clients in the EU27. Assuming that the third-country 
investment banks will relocate mainly to where their clients are located4, they will be likely 
to expand their existing activities in the EU27. Ireland and Germany have large shares of the 
turnover and employment of Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Some of the largest operations of 
Citigroup are in France, Germany and Spain. For Goldman Sachs, the Netherlands is signif-
icant in terms of turnover and Germany in terms of employment. The highest shares of JP 
3 Unfortunately, we could not trace detailed data for UBS, so of the Swiss investment banks, only Credit Suisse is 
included.
4 For detailed conclusions see Sapir et al (2017).
An overwhelming 
share of investment 
banks’ turnover 
and employment is 
located in the UK, 
highlighting the UK’s 
role as a gateway 
to the continental 
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Morgan’s EU27 turnover are in Luxembourg and Germany, and the highest shares of employ-
ment are in Ireland, Luxembourg and Germany. The largest shares of Morgan Stanley’s EU27 
operations are in France and to a lesser extent Italy. Lastly, Credit Suisse operates mainly 
through two UK-based entities, Credit Suisse International and Credit Suisse Securities Ltd. 
The largest Credit Suisse EU27 branches are in France and Germany, which represent larger 
shares in terms of turnover than in terms of staff.
Table 3: Turnover and employees of the UK operations of the largest US and Swiss 
investment banks, end-2014
 Turnover BAML Citigroup Goldman 
Sachs
JP 
Morgan
Morgan 
Stanley
Credit 
Suisse 
Belgium 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 0.00%
Denmark 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.00%
France 0.01% 2.41% 0.00% 0.54% 3.86% 4.84%
Germany 1.02% 9.79% 0.70% 2.49% 0.06% 1.46%
Greece 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00%
Ireland 1.72% 0.47% 0.03% 1.87% 0.00% 0.75%
Italy 0.37% 0.64% 0.56% 1.36% 0.98% 0.59%
Luxembourg 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 4.66% 0.02% 0.00%
Netherlands 0.30% 0.00% 1.14% 0.00% 0.31% 0.34%
Poland 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 0.10% 0.06%
Spain 0.00% 1.14% 0.92% 0.50% 0.21% 0.34%
Sweden 0.12% 0.45% 0.04% 0.25% 0.00% 0.19%
UK 95.78% 84.62% 96.59% 87.31% 93.14% 91.43%
Other EMEA non EU 0.68% 0.48% 0.95% 0.48% 1.29% 0.00%
Total EMEA 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 Employees BAML Citigroup Goldman 
Sachs
JP 
Morgan
Morgan 
Stanley
Credit 
Suisse
Belgium 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00%
Denmark 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00%
France 0.00% 1.70% 0.00% 0.27% 2.12% 1.72%
Germany 1.19% 6.48% 0.72% 6.39% 0.12% 1.38%
Greece 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00%
Ireland 9.52% 0.32% 0.04% 9.33% 0.00% 0.73%
Italy 0.99% 0.92% 0.45% 2.17% 1.66% 0.26%
Luxembourg 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.16% 0.31% 0.00%
Netherlands 0.17% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 0.12% 0.24%
Poland 0.00% 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.10% 0.03%
Spain 0.00% 2.11% 0.43% 1.00% 0.00% 0.13%
Sweden 0.09% 1.07% 0.07% 0.46% 0.00% 0.08%
UK 87.06% 83.84% 96.68% 69.78% 94.19% 95.43%
Other EMEA non EU 0.97% 3.57% 0.99% 0.88% 1.36% 0.00%
Total EMEA 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Bruegel based on Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2016) and EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) country-by-country reports. 
Note: The data refers to the banks’ investment banking activities in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA).
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Table 4: Geographic split and wholesale versus retail split of top 13 systematically 
important banks (SIBs) in the euro area, end-2015
Geographic split
Assets 
(€bns)
Home
Other euro 
area
EU non-
euro area
Non-EU
BNP Paribas 1,994 25% 36% 11% 28%
Crédit Agricole 1,699 81% 8% 2% 8%
Deutsche Bank 1,629 26% 19% 9% 46%
Santander 1,340 28% 11% 31% 29%
Société Générale 1,334 72% 8% 10% 11%
BPCE 1,167 91% 2% 1% 6%
UniCredit 860 40% 35% 22% 3%
ING 842 36% 38% 9% 17%
BBVA 750 39% 10% 4% 47%
Crédit Mutuel 707 89% 8% 1% 3%
Intesa Sanpaolo 676 85% 5% 6% 5%
Rabobank 670 74% 5% 2% 20%
Commerzbank 533 52% 19% 16% 13%
Wholesale and retail banking split
Corporate & 
global
Asset 
management
Retail Other Reporting
BNP Paribas 54.4% 0.9% 30.1% 14.6% Total assets
Crédit Agricole 51.1% 5.3% 13.3% 30.4% Total assets
Deutsche Bank 76.4% 5.5% 15.8% 2.3% Total assets
Santander 11.6% 0.0% 88.4% 0.0%
Operating 
income
Société Générale 56.6% 9.8% 24.6% 9.0% Total assets
BPCE 40.3% 0.0% 59.2% 0.5% Total assets
UniCredit 15.8% 6.2% 77.6% 0.4%
Operating 
income
ING 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0%
Operating 
income
BBVA 8.7% 0.0% 91.3% 0.0% Loans
Crédit Mutuel 9.1% 2.1% 71.4% 17.4%
Operating 
income
Intesa Sanpaolo 17.3% 13.5% 63.1% 6.1% Total assets
Commerzbank 33.2% 31.2% 21.0% 14.6% Total assets
Source: Bruegel based on SNL financials and annual reports of banks. Note: Data split for Rabobank is not available. Insurance activities of 
banks are included in others. Data for Commerzbank is for 2014, instead of 2015.
Table 4 lists the largest euro-area banks with assets over €500 billion (Schoenmaker and 
Véron, 2016), and lists the geographical segmentation of their assets by home country, other 
euro-area countries, non-euro EU countries (mainly the UK) and non-EU countries. Most of 
the large euro-area banks appear to have a substantial presence in London5. Table 4 further 
highlights that the large French banks (BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale) 
and Deutsche Bank have substantial wholesale market activities (shown as corporate and 
global banking in Table 4). These activities cover more than 50 percent of their total business. 
It is thus no surprise to find these universal banks in the top 12 of the investment bank league 
5 Only Santander (with 31 percent in EU non-EA) has both a retail and wholesale presence in the UK.
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table (Table 2). It should be noted that not all of the corporate and global banking covered by 
the first column of Table 4 relates to wholesale markets (eg corporate lending is not regarded 
as wholesale market activity).
The next group of euro-area banks is more scattered, with a combination of retail and 
wholesale activities. Wholesale market activities account for between 10 percent and 40 per-
cent of the business of BPCE, ING, Commerzbank, Intesa Sanpaolo, UniCredit and Santander. 
Only UniCredit, ING and Santander are part of the top 20 investment bank league (Table 2). 
The remaining euro-area banks have a predominantly retail focus.
From this review, we conclude that the core group of banks, which will contribute to the 
building up of the EU27 wholesale markets, comprises the five US and two Swiss investment 
banks, two large UK banks (Barclays and HSBC), the top three French banks and the biggest 
German bank. In the second circle, there are some Italian, Dutch and Spanish banks.
4 Markets
London is a global player and a European hub for trading in terms of the size and diversity 
of its markets. It has an unparalleled position in terms of over-the-counter (OTC) foreign 
exchange and interest rate derivatives trading, particularly in the euro market and to a great 
extent the US dollar market. In terms of foreign exchange trading, the electronic nature of the 
transactions and the UK’s dominant position in the market lead us to believe that the UK’s 
position in forex trading will largely remain unchanged after Brexit. Moreover, forex trading in 
London is settled through Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS), a global multi-currency set-
tlement system, and it is not dependent on London’s access to Target2, the ECB’s settlement 
system, if the access to Target2 is disrupted after Brexit (Schoenmaker, 2017).
Almost half (43 percent) of the daily foreign exchange spot transactions in euros takes 
place in the UK (Figure 1) followed by US (19 percent), France (5 percent), Singapore (4 
percent) and Germany (3 percent). Moreover, the UK is one of the biggest trading centres for 
major emerging countries’ currencies and it is the most important destination for renminbi 
trading outside of Hong Kong.
Figure 1: OTC daily foreign exchange spot transactions, share of the market, %
Source: Bruegel based on BIS Triennial Survey, 2016.
The UK’s share of total forex derivatives turnover (all countries and all products) was about 
40 percent in 2013, declining to about 37 percent in 2016. For the three major currencies 
(dollar, euro and yen), the UK remains the largest market, more than twice the size of the US 
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market (Table 5). In the EU27, France has the biggest share of the market (2.8 percent) ahead 
of Germany (1.7 percent). Both France and Germany increased their shares of euro-denomi-
nated forex trading from 2013 to 2016.
OTC interest-rate derivatives represent more than two-thirds of the overall OTC deriva-
tives market globally. The UK is the market leader in interest-rate derivatives denominated 
in euro (75 percent) and pound sterling (95 percent), while the US is the market leader in 
US dollar denominated interest-rate derivatives (78 percent). Both the UK and the US have 
increased their shares since 2013 (Table 6). Almost half of the UK’s trade in OTC interest-rate 
derivatives is denominated in euros (48.6 percent) compared to transactions in pound ster-
ling (4.7 percent) and US dollars (5.4 percent). In terms of interest-rate derivatives trading 
in the EU27, France has the biggest share of euro-denominated trading with 13.2 percent 
Table 5: Global OTC foreign exchange derivatives turnover in April 2013 and 2016 (daily averages in $ millions)
Panel A 
April 2013
France Germany United Kingdom United States Total
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount
Euro 106,782 4.8% 65,593 2.9% 1,009,345 45.1% 395,495 17.7% 2,238,028
Pound 27,815 3.6% 15,892 2.1% 424,918 55.0% 134,812 17.5% 772,070
US Dollar 162,172 2.8% 88,176 1.5% 2,397,494 41.2% 1,119,964 19.2% 5,824,625
Total 189,878 2.8% 110,882 1.7% 2,725,993 40.9% 1,262,799 18.9% 6,671,446
Panel B  
April 2016
France Germany United Kingdom United States Total
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount
Euro 103,519 5.1% 67,701 3.3% 884,912 43.4% 395,675 19.4% 2,040,979
Pound 24,918 3.1% 14,989 1.9% 399,200 49.5% 179,670 22.3% 805,791
US Dollar 154,244 2.7% 95,562 1.7% 2,143,395 37.3% 1,101,746 19.2% 5,742,241
Total 180,600 2.8% 116,381 1.8% 2,406,301 36.9% 1,272,122 19.5% 6,515,396
Source: Bruegel based on BIS Triennial Survey, 2013 and 2016. Note: Foreign exchange derivatives include spot transactions, outright forwards, foreign exchange swaps, currency 
options and other products.
Table 6: Global OTC single currency interest rate derivatives turnover in April 2013 and 2016 (daily averages in $ 
millions)
Panel A 
April 2013
France Germany United Kingdom United States Total
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount
Euro 141,245 10.6% 88,125 6.6% 927,840 69.4% 27,090 2.0% 1,336,075
Pound 4,746 2.3% 4,728 2.3% 189,802 91.9% 3,162 1.5% 206,643
US Dollar 52,080 6.7% 6,205 0.8% 110,235 14.2% 546,268 70.4% 776,268
Total 202,210 7.3% 101,347 3.7% 1,347,749 48.9% 628,153 22.8% 2,758,583
Panel B  
April 2016
France Germany United Kingdom United States Total
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount Share of 
total, %
Amount
Euro 100,648 13.2% 16,562 2.2% 573,664 75.2% 6,832 0.9% 762,494
Pound 6,648 2.5% 506 0.2% 247,489 94.8% 2,333 0.9% 261,113
US Dollar 26,833 1.8% 2,455 0.2% 215,157 14.4% 1,167,958 78.0% 1,497,627
Total 141,215 4.7% 31,311 1.0% 1,180,246 39.0% 1,240,774 41.0% 3,028,031
Source: Bruegel based on BIS Triennial Survey, 2013 and 2016. Note: OTC single currency interest rate derivatives include forward rate agreements, swaps, options and 
other products.
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in 2016, an increase from 10.6 percent in 2013. Germany’s share across all major currencies 
has declined. Most notably, Germany’s share of euro-denominated interest-rate derivative 
trading fell from 6.6 percent in 2013 to 2.2 percent in 2016. As such, in terms of OTC inter-
est-rate derivatives trading capacity in the EU27, France is emerging as the main player ahead 
of Germany.
5 Clearing
Table 7 on the next page lists the centralised counterparties (CCPs) located in the EU. All 
four UK-based CCPs –the London Clearing House (LCH Clearnet), London Metal Exchange 
(LME), CME Clear (part of the US headquartered Chicago Mercantile Exchange) and ICE 
Clearing Europe (part of the US headquartered Intercontinental Exchange) – are recognised 
by the EU and must comply with the requirements of the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR, (EU) No 648/2012)6.
Of the four UK-based CCPs, the largest part of euro-denominated trading occurs through 
LCH Clearnet. LCH Clearnet Group Ltd is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and has a subsidiary in France called LCH SA. The UK-based LCH Ltd, unlike 
LCH SA, is a multi-currency clearing house with daily trading volumes of euro-denominated 
swaps totalling €887 billion and a monthly repo-clearing volume of €6.2 trillion (as of October 
2016)7. LCH’s volume of euro-denominated clearing and settlement far exceeds the volumes 
of the other CCPs that operate in both the UK and the EU27.
Is there sufficient capacity and infrastructure within the euro area to absorb the clearing 
business, based on existing arrangements? Table 7 shows that there is no euro-area equiva-
lent of a large centralised clearing services provider like LCH Clearnet. Presently, the largest 
CCPs in the euro area are Eurex Clearing in Germany, the LCH Clearnet Group owned LCH 
SA in France, EuroCCP in the Netherlands and CCG in Italy. However, these large euro-area 
CCPs are limited in their product coverage (EuroCCP only clears securities) and in currency 
coverage (LCH SA France and CCG in Italy only clear euro-denominated products).
One of the main recipients of London’s euro-denominated clearing business could poten-
tially be Eurex in Germany. Eurex is a multi-currency clearing house that clears across deriv-
atives, securities and repos, but its clearing volumes are smaller than those of LCH Clear-
net. For instance, in terms of euro-denominated OTC derivatives, LCH Clearnet’s notional 
outstanding clearing volumes are more than five times those of Eurex8. Moreover, the OTC 
derivatives market in Germany is quite limited: of the global euro-denominated OTC deriva-
tives market, only 2 percent is located in Germany compared to 13 percent in France (Table 6, 
panel B). In terms of the repo market, the monthly clearing volume at Eurex is between €4.5 
trillion and €6 trillion per month, coming close to the level of cleared repo trades at LCH SA in 
Paris.
Clearing and settlement of euro-denominated trades in London was a contested issue 
even in the pre-Brexit environment (Batsaikhan, 2016). In 2011, the European Central Bank 
issued guidance that large-scale offshore CCPs should be fully incorporated in the euro area 
with full operational and managerial control. The UK fought this ECB ‘location policy’ in court 
and won the case on the grounds that the ECB lacks the necessary competence to regulate 
6 Recognised Clearing Houses, Bank of England, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/fmis/
supervised_sys/rch.aspx, accessed 17 January 2017.
7 LCH, http://www.lch.com/asset-classes/repoclear/volumes, accessed 19 December 2016.
8 Bruegel based on LCH (http://www.lch.com/asset-classes/otc-interest-rate-derivatives/volumes) and Eurex 
(http:// www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-en/markets-services/eurex-otc-clear/interest-rate-swaps/clearing-vol-
ume, http:// www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/market-data/statistics/monthly-statistics). Note: Notional 
outstanding as of 20 December 2016.
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securities clearing systems9. Post-Brexit, the European Commission might propose that the 
ECB be given the necessary legal competence (Barker and Brunsden, 2016). Another sugges-
tion is that there could be a more joint approach, as is applied currently to EU-based CCPs 
that operate in the US, with these CCPs supervised both by their home countries and by the 
US authorities. In order to limit systemic risk concerns and disruptions in the euro-clearing 
business both the UK and EU authorities should consider adopting a US-style approach by 
sharing supervisory roles for systematically important extraterritorial CCPs (Sapir et al, 2017).
In the meantime, the €24 billion merger between LSE (owner of LCH Clearnet Group) and 
Deutsche Börse is at the time of writing still pending. The European Commission is reviewing 
the case for competition concerns, with a recommendation due in March 2017. LCH Clearnet 
Group has agreed to sell its French subsidiary LCH SA if the merger goes ahead.
9 General Court of the European Union (2015) Judgement in Case T-496/11 United Kingdom vs. European Central 
Bank, http:// curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-03/cp150029en.pdf.
Table 7: Comparative overview of CCPs in the EU, end-2015
Country / CCP Products Currency No. transactions 
(millions)
Number of 
participants
Profit after tax 
(000s)
Headcount
Germany
Eurex Clearing 
AG
Securities, 
Derivatives, 
Repo
EUR, CHF, 
GBP, USD
3,581.5 186 1,097 178
France
LCH.Clearnet 
SA
Securities, 
Derivatives, 
Repo
EUR 459.3 110 28,200 168
Netherlands
LCH.Clearnet 
SA (see France)
Securities, 
Derivatives, 
Repo
EUR 242.4 - - -
EuroCCP N.V. Securities
Multi-
currency (9)
1,758.8 45 6,300 44
Belgium
LCH.Clearnet 
SA (see France)
Securities, 
Derivatives, 
Repo
EUR 41.4 - - -
Italy
CCG
Securities, 
Derivatives, 
Repo
EUR 235.4 82
LCH. Clearnet 
SA (see France)
Securities, 
Derivatives, 
Repo
EUR 2.1 NA - -
United Kingdom
LCH. Clearnet 
Ltd
Securities, 
Derivatives, 
Repo
Multi-
currency (18)
336* 154 63,800 452
ICE Clear 
Europe
Derivatives
Multi-
currency (13)
1,136.9 79 493 -
LME Clear 
Limited
Derivatives
USD, EUR, 
JPY, GBP
0.34 42 6,107 43
CME Clearing 
Europe Limited
Derivatives
Multi-
currency (18)
0.75 19 - -
Source: Bruegel based on BIS and annual reports of CCPs. Note: (*) Data for 2013.
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When the UK exits the EU, UK-based CCPs will have to apply for equivalence from the 
European Commission to operate in the EU in accordance with Article 25 of EMIR. Third 
country CCPs applying for the right to operate in the EU must be authorised by the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). As of the end of September 2016, 21 third-country 
CCPs from 10 countries had been authorised to carry out clearing services in the EU. Scar-
petta and Booth (2016) estimate that it takes two and a half to four years to obtain author-
isation, which makes it nearly impossible to aim for equivalence authorisation by the time 
the UK negotiations to exit the EU end10. Appropriate transition arrangements are therefore 
important.
6 Professional services
The financial sector is supported by a large professional services sector, which covers con-
sulting, legal services and auditing. The professional services sector employs as many people 
as the financial sector itself. Before we turn to detailed employment figures, we discuss two 
issues in detail: the legal system and innovation.
The legal system
The legal documentation for trading, in particular derivatives, is made up of the ISDA (Inter-
national Swaps and Derivatives Association) Master Agreements, which are based on com-
mon law (London and New York). In terms of contract law, it will have to be clarified if EU27 
wholesale markets can work on the basis of ISDA agreements based on English law. Contracts 
under English law can be subject of judicial decisions from EU27 courts. The advantage of this 
solution would be that well-established legal practices (contracts and case law) can continue 
without disruption. 
The alternative would be to base contracts on the legal system of the host country (eg 
Germany, France, Ireland or the Netherlands), which would minimise execution risk. As 
German courts, for example, are more familiar with German law. Nevertheless, market 
participants expect to continue to be able to use English contract law as the basis for trading 
documentation.
Separately, investment bankers already use local corporate law in areas such as public 
offerings and mergers and acquisitions. These are grounded in the corporate cultures and 
practices (including the corporate governance codes) of the countries of incorporation. That 
will not change.
Innovation and FinTech
The UK has established its position as the biggest FinTech and financial innovation centre in 
Europe, followed by Germany, with other EU countries far behind (TheCityUK, 2016b). Glob-
ally, the UK leads in terms of market size and is second after the US in terms of investment 
and employment. The British FinTech industry employs 61,000 people, just below 6 percent of 
the total financial services workforce.
A growing export sector, especially for emerging markets and Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, FinTech has been a central part of the UK’s global com-
petitiveness strategy. Since the Brexit vote, however, venture capital investment has declined 
in the UK, while continuing to grow in Germany (KPMG, 2016). Decline in investment in the 
UK is partly due to political uncertainty delaying investment decisions in talent and human 
capital.
10 Scarpetta and Booth (2016) also claim that two years is a lower bound and that Commission was already assessing 
the equivalence applications before EMIR entered into force.
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Figure 2: Market size, investments and staff in FinTech in 2015
Source: TheCityUK (2016b). 
Employment
Around 2.2 million people were employed in the UK finance and related professional sector 
in 2014, with one-third of employment in London (TheCityUK, 2016b). Professional servic-
es in London, including legal services, consultancy and accounting, employ about 372,000 
people, while financial services, including banking, insurance, fund management, securities 
and others, employ about 354,000 people. It should be noted that professional and financial 
services employees are highly mobile, and these services can be executed remotely. Invest-
ment bankers and consultants are, for example, used to flying out during the working week to 
wherever in Europe the client is based, returning to their place of residence for the weekend. 
Employment that will move out of London and into the EU27 therefore largely depends on the 
rules and regulations put into place after the negotiations.
In Sapir et al (2017), we estimate that 35 percent of wholesale banking activities might 
move to the EU27 and that 10 to 15 percent of employees might move with this volume of 
business (this amounts to 10,000 people in the wholesale banking sector). These estimates are 
based on the supervisory ‘substance’ requirement, which requires newly licenced investment 
bank entities in the EU27 to have executive and senior staff in place (see Sapir et al, 2017, for 
details).
There are no such ‘substance’ requirements for professional services. We therefore esti-
mate that only about 5 percent of the professional services sector, amounting to 18,000 to 
20,000 people, might move with the financial sector from London to the EU27.
Table 8: Employment and finance and related professional services in UK and in 
London, thousands
Sector Total UK London
Employment 
in professional 
services
Legal services 314
1116
105
372Management consultancy 483 161
Accounting 319 106
Employment 
in financial 
services
Banking 417
1061
139
354
Insurance 309 103
Fund management 42 14
Securities 48 16
Other financial services 245 82
Total 2177 726
Source: Bruegel based on TheCityUK , ONS Business Register and Employment Survey.
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